Home > Corruption, Papua New Guinea > National Provident Fund Final Report [Part 48]

National Provident Fund Final Report [Part 48]

October 12, 2015 Leave a comment Go to comments

Below we continue the re-publication of the serialized edited version of the National Provident Fund Commission of Inquiry Final Report that first appeared in the Post Courier newspaper in 2002/3.

The Inquiry findings provide an unprecedented insight into the methods that are still being used today by the mobocracy that is routinely plundering our government finances. The inquiry uncovered for the first time how the Waigani mafia organise complex frauds using mate-networks, shelf companies, proxy shareholders, and a willing fraternity of lawyers, accountants, bankers and other expert professionals.

The Commission findings also reveal the one grand truth at the centre of all the corruption in Papua New Guinea: it is pure theft, no different from an ordinary bank robbery. However, if you steal the money by setting up, for instance, a bogus land transaction, the crude nature of the criminal enterprise is disguised to all but forensic experts, making it seem the perfect crime! 

NPF Final Report

This is the 48th extract from the National Provident Fund (now known as NASFUND) Commission of Inquiry report. The inquiry was conducted by retired justice Tos Barnett and investigated widespread misuse of member funds. The report recommended action be taken against several high-profile leaders, including former NPF chairman Jimmy Maladina. The report was tabled in Parliament on November 20 by Prime Minister Sir Michael Somare.

Executive Summary Schedule 4L Continued 

4. APPROVALS had to be in place for the construction;
5. CROCODILE would accept a five per cent share in the project if MBI also injected capital into the project;
6. CROCODILE would provide loan finance provided it was given preferential repayment from the profits of the project.

These conditions were never fulfilled and by December 1997 they were completely overlooked by management and the boards of both NPF and Crocodile.

At the December 10, 1997, Crocodile Board meeting, the directors accepted a woefully inadequate feasibility study presented by Mr Jewiss and failed to have it reviewed professionally.

Then, without observing that the conditions previously imposed had not been met, the Crocodile Board approved participation in the project subject only to “satisfactory financial arrangements”.

At the NPF Board meeting on December 11, the board endorsed the decision of the Crocodile Board to proceed with the project, giving no thought to the financial arrangements.

In March 1998, with no source of funding in place, with no title to the land where the hotel was to be built and without any authority to carry on business in Indonesia, Crocodile signed a joint venture agreement with MBI. Mr Jewiss accepted the help of Nicolo Lolong, a former Indonesian Government official, to help guide Crocodile through the legal and bureaucratic requirements.

The arrangements with Mr Lolong were never properly finalised and this led to serious legal complications as Mr Lolong later refused to hand over land titles to Crocodile until his claim was paid.

South East Asian Financial Crisis

At this stage, in March 1998, the catastrophic impact of the South East Asian financial crisis on the Indonesian economy, currency and inflation was daily headline news. Neither Mr Jewiss, the Crocodile Board, the NPF management nor the NPF Trustees paused to critically assess the effect this crisis would have on the Maluk Bay investment. All parties were in gross breach of duty by this failure.

The Joint Venture 

The joint venture agreement was between Crocodile, MBI and MSP (a local company which would hold the land once it was acquired). A joint venture company was to be established as a foreign investment company under the laws of Indonesia. The partners investment in the company would be $US1.6 million consisting of $US1.12 million loan finance and $US480,000 in share capital to be contributed as follows:-

Crocodile – $US240,000
MBI – $US230,000
MSP – $US9,000.

The joint venture agreement also provided that Crocodile would provide a loan for working capital but did not specify how much (paragraph 7.5.4).

Crocodile immediately employed Mr Wilson and Mr Goodfellow (shareholders in MBI) to manage the construction of the hotel “in-house”, remunerated at $US12,000 per month. The Crocodile Board was not consulted about these critical decisions.


(a) MR Jewiss failed to clarify Mr Lolong’s role and to enter into clear formal contractual relations with him;
(b) MR Jewiss failed to properly advise the Crocodile Board about the implications of the spreading Indonesian financial crisis and the Board of Crocodile was remiss in not seeking advice about the matter;
(c) THE joint venture agreement between Crocodile, MSP and MBI failed to specify the amount of the loan to be supplied by Crocodile;
(d) THE engagement of Mr Goodfellow and Mr Wilson to manage constructions at Maluk Bay in March 1998 was premature, as approval of the project was still subject to finance. The appointment was also made without Crocodile Board approval. As both men were friends of Mr Jewiss and shareholders in MBI, their appointment raises concerns of nepotism and impropriety;
(e) MR Jewiss and Mr Wright acted improperly in arranging finance for the Maluk Bay project through NPF without obtaining the formal approval of either the Crocodile or NPF Boards;
(f) THE methods of providing finance for Crocodile adopted by Mr Jewiss and Wright were unconventional, improper and secretive. This resulted in the NPF and the Crocodile boards losing control over Crocodile’s operations;
(g) THE use of NPF’s trust account with Wilson HTM was in breach of PNG foreign exchange regulations for which Mr Wright, Mr Jewiss and Mr Wilson HTM are personally liable;
(h) MR Jewiss’ denial of having knowledge of this arrangement at transcript p. 5566 was false and he should be referred to the Police Commissioner for prosecution.

In May 1998, Mr Fabila replaced Mr Kaul as general manager of NPF and he became a director on the Crocodile Board. Unfortunately, this did not strengthen the control over the management of Crocodile.

In June 1998, Mr Wilson, who was supervising the very early stages of the construction of the hotel, prematurely appointed a Ken Williams as general manager of the hotel, ostensibly to run a three month staff training program before the commencement of hotel operations (paragraph 7.6.5).

To satisfy the growing need for funds, Mr Jewiss and Mr Kaul increased the use of the Wilson HTM account, through which approximately $US600,000 of NPF funds was channelled to Indonesia, without the NPF Board’s knowledge or authority. This of course was illegal.

There was also at least one attempt to transfer funds by way of a false invoice prepared by Patrick Goodfellow at Mr Wright’s request – see paragraph 7.6.3 of the report (This invoice was apparently not used and the commission does not know if there were others).

With no financing plan in place, Crocodile management kept up the expenditure in the belief that NPF would foot the bills and that Noel Wright would find ways to achieve this. This process led directly to the loss of $US160,000 that was paid as a deposit on kitchen equipment when there were no funds to pay the balance owing (see paragraph 7.7.2).


(a) MR Wright’s extensive use of NPF’s Wilson HTM’s money market account to transfer approximately $US600,000 to the PT Cipta Boga Baya bank account at Mataram, was illegal and completely without the NPF Board’s authority. It resulted in the boards of both the NPF and Crocodile being by-passed and indicates that both boards had lost financial control of their respective management teams;
(b) IT is clear that Mr Jewiss was party to this method of funding Crocodile;
(c) IN view of Mr Copland’s close connections with Mr Wright, as he was chairman of both boards, and as the evidence is that he kept himself informed of major management issues, the commission finds that Mr Copland must also have been aware that finance was being provided to Crocodile by this extra legal means, without board approval;
(d) CROCODILE suffered significant loss when large deposits were paid to purchase equipment when there were no funds to pay the balance of purchase moneys;
(e) NPF’s system of financial control was weak in that it enabled Mr Wright to misuse NPF’s account with Wilson HTM undiscovered, as there were no checks or balances in place.

Not surprisingly, these weak financial controls and unorthodox and secretive methods of providing funds, led to a budget blow out from the approved $US1.6 million to $US4.178 million.

At Mr Copland’s direction, Mr Wright visited Maluk Bay and performed an audit. His audit report was seriously inadequate and failed to highlight the following critical issues to the board, including:-

  • AN assessment of the local economy and the impact of the economic crisis;
  • DETAILS of the contractual arrangements;
  • THERE was no audit of the financial records;
  • THERE was no analysis of the project costs to date, including actual versus budget figures;
  • THERE was no management performance assessment;
  • THERE was no assessment of the business risks and
  • THERE was no update on the land title issue. (Paragraph 7.7.3)

In 1999, the NPF management and Trustees finally began tackling NPF’s financial crisis and enlisted the help of PwC. This exposed the fact that NPF management had been funding the Maluk Bay project by various means without the board’s knowledge.

Mr Jewiss was called before the NPF special board meeting on February 8, 1999. It was resolved to cease funding the Maluk Bay project and to review critical matters like land title, the joint venture agreements, using the Wilson HTM account to pay invoices and to require evidence of the $US50,000 equity contribution from the joint venture partners.

Unfortunately, the shut down of funding was so complete that a care and maintenance budget to protect NPF’s physical assets (including the partially completed hotel), was not provided. This resulted in damage and further loss.

Mr Maladina 

By this time, Mr Maladina was chairman of both the NPF and Crocodile Boards and his dubious influence quickly began to manifest.

In April, Mr Maladina unilaterally appointed a friend, Peter Petroulas, (of “Precise Strategies”) to review the Maluk Bay project.

During the review, Mr Petroulas began setting a scene to make continued NPF funding contingent on buying MBI out of the joint venture by buying 60 per cent of MBI shares for the low sum of $US1,000, claiming to be acting for “a powerful lobby group” close to the NPF.

Also in April, Mr Maladina, unilaterally and without the authority of the Crocodile Board, negotiated a new contract appointing his friend, Mr Barredo, as managing director of Crocodile on very favourable terms, including a grant of 150,000 Crocodile shares each year. The contract was approved by the NPF board but, to be valid, it required a resolution from the Crocodile Board. Mr Maladina, however, signed the contract himself, as chairman of Crocodile and illegally affixed the company seal to it.

Meanwhile, MBI’s interests were being looked after by its prominent shareholder and Crocodile employee, Keith Wilson. Completely without legal authority (but purporting to use a lapsed invalid power of attorney which had been granted for another purpose), Mr Wilson signed, on behalf of Crocodile, a variation to the joint venture agreement, which purported to commit Crocodile to provide all funding in the form of a loan.

The variation, which was very favourable to MBI, also provided that Crocodile would reimburse all shareholders for contributions to the purchase of land. This purported variation to the agreement is invalid (details in paragraph 7.9.3).


(a) WHEN rejecting requests for further funding for Maluk Bay, the NPF Board was remiss in not providing even a care and maintenance budget to protect its investment;
(b) MR Maladina’s unilateral decision to appoint his friend, Peter Petroulas, to review the Maluk Bay project was improper, beyond his authority and amounted to nepotism;
(c) MR Jewiss falsely informed Mr MacKenzie of MBI that Crocodile intended to fund the entire project knowing that this was contrary to the agreement and that the Crocodile Board had not resolved to do so;
(d) MR Wilson improperly purported to sign an amendment to the joint venture agreement, favouring MBI, at the expense of Crocodile. As Mr Wilson had an interest in MBI, was not authorised by Crocodile to amend the agreement and had such a clear conflict of interest, his action was improper as well as being legally ineffective.

After ceasing as managing director in April 1999, Mr Jewiss was directed to try and finalise the land title issue at Maluk Bay. No one seemed to have “on the ground” overall responsibility for the Indonesian operations and, with no funding, things came to a standstill.

The private management agreement between Crocodile and Gary Jewiss Ltd was eventually terminated in August 1999.

Financial Controls And Funding Of Crocodile’s Activities In Indonesia 

Because of poor and incomplete records, some of which have not yet been returned to PNG, the commission has not been able to fully account for all funds expended on the Maluk Bay project.

The management and directors of Crocodile were in breach of their duties under the Companies Act 1997 in this regard. As NPF was the sole shareholder of Crocodile, the management and Trustees of NPF must also be held responsible for not ensuring that the Crocodile Board (comprised entirely of NPF Trustees and officers) exercised proper control over the Crocodile management and maintained ultimate financial control.

Commission staff have pieced together the financial history of Maluk Bay and the results of this task are detailed in paragraph 8 of the report. It sets out details of amounts transferred through the Wilson HTM account ($US991,773), through D&J Consultants ($US145,000), through Patrick Goodfellow ($US41,000), the Bank Negara Account of PT Cipta Boga Baya (the “umbrella” company utilised by Crocodile) ($US783,573), Garry Jewiss-rent ($US22,200), direct funding from NPF ($US81,357), funding from Crocodile in PNG (K1,851,958) and funding from the Cikobas catering contract ($US80,550).

Funds Expended On The Maluk Bay Project 

The various records show an investment of approximately K4.3 million in the Maluk Bay project, which has been written down to nil in the Crocodile books. See table below. (Transcript p. 6277)

npf 48 a

A funding statement to PT Cipta Boga Baya was obtained. Commission staff have traced the known transfer of funds from the various sources mentioned above. Our Staff also obtained credit notes to confirm that these funds were received by the specified banks. The commission finds that there was no “leakage” of funds prior to their receipt into Crocodile’s bank accounts in Indonesia.


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  1. October 13, 2015 at 12:02 pm

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